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A couple of weeks after Pakistan’s new Chief of Army Staff (COAS) 
General Oamar Bajwa took over the reins from General Raheel Sharif, 
Lieutenant General Naveed Mukhtar was appointed Director General 
(DG) of the country’s powerful spy agency Inter-Service Intelligence 
(ISI) on December 12th. According to some analysts, these two new 
appointments could be part of a major reshuffle in the military’s top 
brass, which might initiate political changes, especially in its foreign 
policy or in the country’s unhealthy civil-military relations. However one 
can’t help thinking that such predictions sound like a déjà vu recurring 
each time when posts for the most powerful positions in Pakistan are 
vacant. Analysing the careers, former deployments and personal 
characteristics of the respective individual soldiers, some observers tend 
to construct a peculiar rationale why the situation should turn for the 
better regarding the enhancement of civilian decision-making power in 
crucial policy fields and subsequently the promotion of democratization. 
In this context, especially the statements regarding identified potential 
aloofness towards politics due to professional behaviour (in other words, 
maintaining a ‘low political profile’ is perceived a priori as a ‘pro-
democracy credential’), and/or ‘constructive exchange’ with Indian or 
Afghan counterparts of the top officers are serving as indications for the 
likelihood of new political and institutional changes. 
Keywords: Chief of Army Staff, COAS, DG ISI, ISI, Civil-Military Relations, 
CMR, Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, terrorism, democracy, civilian control, 
General Oamar Bajwa, Nawaz Sharif, General Naveed Mukhtar 
 COMMENT
But such forecasts are doomed to be fail for several reasons: Firstly, the significance and 
capacities of an individual person, even for a member of the top brass (namely COAS or 
DG ISI), to enforce an institutional change is limited and as such it is generally overrated. 	
Moreover, both the army and the intelligence have their own internal power structures and 
decision-making mechanisms, keeping the influence of its top representative in check. For 
example Pakistan’s COAS finds its limitation through the powerful Corps Commander 
Conference and the realm of the DG ISI is limited through internal interests groups, also 
often described as ‘Circles within Circles’ (especially by those elements who have a soft 
corner for jihadism and militancy). Furthermore, COAS and DG ISI usually serve only for a 
few years, hardly enough time to get to grips with sprawling institutions.	
Secondly, the Pakistan’s security agents are not only extraordinary vast entities but also 
their institutional patterns and their role are deeply entrenched in the country’s political 
administrative structures. Subsequently they possess an extraordinary high degree of 
resilience towards any substantial reform. 
In this context, the very same optimistic observers celebrated the first ‘regular’ transition of 
power between two civilian governments in the country in the 2013 national elections as an 
indicator for democratic consolidation. However, the appreciation of this allegedly ‘new 
democratic wave’ faded out the hardiness of the decade-old authoritarian and anti-
democratic trajectories of Pakistan’s conservative establishment. The latter one consist of 
‘a nebulous web of generals, bureaucrats and hand-picked politicians’ that define the core of 
the country’s national defence and internal security policies. The central government in 
Islamabad never experienced a situation that could be described as civilian supremacy over 
the military. Nevertheless, one could emphasize that the armed forces did not influence the 
last general polls outside the benchmarks as the civilian government defined them. But 
civilian control means also that the elected civilians have control over all the decision-
making processes. But this is not the case in Pakistan today. Civilians never had any say on 
crucial policy fields, especially not in foreign policy, national defence and security, 
nuclearization, or military organization. One should also note that the appointment of 
General Oamar Bajwa as COAS by Prime Minister Sharif was mainly possible because the 
predecessor General Raheel Sharif decided to retire and was not interested in an extension 
of his tenure. As such it is true that the process of the latest COAS appointment followed 
constitutional requirements. But it would be misleading to interpret this as a power shift 
towards civilians in a way that Prime Minister Sharif Nawaz is ‘asserting his authority’ in 
the area of military organisation.  	
However, until recently, civilians possessed decision-making power in some areas of public 
policy (as long as the economic interests of the military were not negatively affected) and 
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before 9/11 also had some leverage in internal security. But this changed with the start of 
the China-Pakistan-Economic Corridor (CPEC) project, a Chinese supported multi-million-
dollar development project. Being overwhelmed by the challenge of eradicating domestic 
security threats to ensure a smooth and safe CPEC implementation, the central government 
granted the soldiers an increasing formal, institutionalised role in the country’s political 
system. As a matter of fact, the National Action Plan (NAP) was formulated emphasizing 
the fight against terrorism as the country’s top priority, which of course will be ensured by 
the security sector agents. Also, the Constitution was amended in favour of the 
establishment of military courts. More concretely, the 21st Amendment Act provides for the 
creation of ‘military speed trial courts’ for offenses relating to terrorism, waging war against 
Pakistan and prevention of acts threatening the security of the country. The latter ones 
determine a significant transfer of power to armed forces’ authorities, especially since with 
the new legal regulations civilians can be subjected to military jurisdiction. In addition, the 
army enforced the establishment of the so-called Apex Committees, constituting a quasi-
parallel administrative structure sidelining the executive and legislative powers on the 
national and provincial level in all matters regarding the CPEC development. However, the 
Apex Committees, where the military top brass is the main decision-maker, quickly 
emerged as the most important institution in the current structure of governance, also 
because mega-projects like CPEC affect all spheres of people’s life. 	
In result, the new COAS Bajwa inherits from his predecessor General Raheel Sharif, a 
military, which not only dominates almost all spheres of government but also acts as ‘state 
within the state’.	
One can identify a very similar phenomenon  in the context of the ISI. Besides the lack of 
civilian control over the army, the government has almost no oversight over the ISI. This is 
gaining significance, since Pakistan’s prime intelligence organisation has been long accused 
of supporting Jihadists. They have been accused of targeting neighbouring countries, 
foremost India and Afghanistan, as well as turning a blind eye towards radicalised Islamists 
preaching violence and hate against the country’s minorities and arch rival India. 
Furthermore, despite being constitutionally responsible for dealing with external security 
threats, the ISI is facing allegations of meddling in the country’s politics, like conducting 
numerous attempts undermining civilian governments. Serving primarily as the covert arm 
of the army, the DG ISI reports only in theory to the prime minister as set by the rules, but 
in practice he reports directly to the COAS. As such, it does not come by surprise that the 
announcement of General Akhtar's promotion to DG ISIS didn’t come from the Ministry of 
Defence or the Prime Minister Secretariat but through the military's Inter-Services Public 
Relations (ISPR) department. 	
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In sum, the latest reshuffle is far from being an indication of the end of the unfortunate past 
political paths and ‘that democracy is flourishing in the country’, as stated by some 
optimistic observers. In contrasts, Pakistan’s ‘new’ army and intelligence leadership will 
continue the same policies of its predecessors. As such, one should not expect any 
remarkable changes in the country’s repressive domestic policy approaches or the 
abandonment of state-sponsorship of terrorism as a foreign policy instrument. Even if the 
new top brass decided to make a symbolic gesture, they will not be trusted abroad, 
especially in Kabul, New Delhi, and Washington that lost their patience with Pakistan. They 
most likely ‘won’t believe’ whatever Pakistani military and civilian authorities say and 
won’t trust the policies they might initiate towards a rapprochement with the country’s 
neighbourhood. Subsequently, the region will continue to witness incidents of cross-border 
militancy, keeping Pakistan’s bilateral relations at an abysmal state.   	
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